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[A]t about 11:30 p.m. on July 24, 1966, [Casey Reynolds, a white
man,] was engaged in changing a tire when three men approached
from across the highway. One of them shot him from a short dis-
tance away. The three then ran up to within three or four feet.
Reynolds arose from his stooped position and held on to his wife,
who had left the car to watch him as he worked. One of the men
put his hand on Mrs. Reynolds' shoulder. Reynolds testified that
this was Coleman [who was black]. Within a few seconds a car with
its lights on approached, and the three men turned and "ran across
the road . . . ." As they turned to go, Reynolds was shot a second
time. He identified petitioner Stephens [also black] as the gun-
man, stating that he saw him "in the car lights" while "looking
straight at him."'
In the two weeks that followed, Reynolds was only able to vaguely
describe his attackers and unable to identify them from a series of
mugshots. Three months later, Reynolds was called to the police sta-
tion, where he was presented with a lineup of six men. Reynolds sud-
denly remembered, immediately identifying Stephens and Coleman
as his assailants.
At trial, Reynolds again identified the two men and "repeated on
cross-examination his testimony on direct; he said he saw Coleman
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011. B.A., Political
Science and Economics, Northwestern University, 2006. I would like to thank
Professor Joy Tidmalsh for his invaluable guidance. I would also like to thank my
parents, John and Laura, for their unwavering support and indulging my hour long
rants, and my sister Sarah, the real writer in the family.
1 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1970) (fourth alteration in original).
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'face to face,' 'I looked into his face,' 'got a real good look at him."' 2
Coleman and Stephens were both convicted.
3
At trial, Reynolds was asked to the take the stand and testify
regarding the events of that tragic evening. During his testimony he
indicated that, despite the short duration of the events, he could
clearly identify the two shooters. He sat in the witness box and told
his story to a jury of his peers entrusted with the task of determining
whether or not he was telling the truth. How, though, can a jury be
certain that he was right? Our criminal system requires the jury to
find the accused "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," but even such a
high standard of culpability cannot ensure that the jury is right every
time. When the freedom of two men is at stake, is Reynolds's accuracy
not crucial? Only Casey Reynolds, his wife, and his three assailants
knew exactly what happened that night, and even then each may have
had a different recollection, but Reynolds was certain that he recog-
nized the two men. It was nighttime and he had his back turned as
they approached, catching a glance of them after being shot. In the
course of a few seconds, his wife was threatened, and he was surely
stressed. He was shot a second time. In the proceeding weeks he was
unable to clearly describe his attackers. Yet, during a lineup and
again at trial he picked out the two men at whom he said he "got a
real good look."4 These extreme circumstances must cast significant
doubt on his ability to not only see, but also to remember, the men
from that night. Situations such as this have given rise to calls for
reform in the criminal justice system to ensure that innocent people
are not sent to jail on the basis of inaccurate eyewitness testimony.
The Innocence Project, a "national litigation and public policy
organization dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted people," 5
estimates that eyewitness identification was a factor in seventy-five per-
cent of convictions overturned through DNA testing, making it the
"single greatest cause of wrongful convictions" in the United States. 6
"More than 4250 Americans per year are wrongfully convicted due to
2 Id. at4.
3 Id. at 11. Their conviction was vacated by the Supreme Court, but on other
grounds. Id. (vacating and remanding for the absence of counsel for defendants at
preliminary hearings).
4 Id. at 4.
5 INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Oct. 27,
2010).
6 Understand the Causes: Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited
Oct. 27, 2010); see also Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 241, 243 (1986) (estimating over fifty percent of wrongful convic-
tions were due to faulty eyewitness testimony).
[VOL. 86:2
WITNESSING THE WITNESS
sincere, yet woefully inaccurate eyewitness identifications." 7 These num-
bers reveal two problems with eyewitness identification. First, it dem-
onstrates a shortcoming in the cognitive ability of the human brain to
process, store, and recall memories. Second, in trial situations, juries
may be unduly receptive to this mode of unreliable testimony.
Over the last thirty years, the field of cognitive psychology has
made dramatic strides in understanding the way the brain encodes
and stores memories. Researchers have come to realize that, for
example, expressed confidence in the memory of identification is not
a reliable indicator of accuracy;8 high levels of stress impair-rather
than enhance-the ability of individuals to form memories;9 and indi-
viduals of one race are not well equipped to remember the faces of
another race.10 Many of these conclusions are counterintuitive and
not generally understood by the public at large.
It is, of course, the general public that comprises juries. "[I]n
general, juries are unduly receptive to identification evidence and are
not sufficiently aware of its dangers."11 This view is rhetorically shared
by former Justice Brennan: " [T] here is almost nothing more convincing
than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the
defendant, and says 'That's the one!"
' 12
In the face of these two difficulties, lawyers have increasingly
turned to experts to explain to juries shortcomings in memory and to
correct common misconceptions. However, the use of experts is often
met with resistance in some courts finding that expert testimony of
this nature cuts to the heart of the jury's function and usurps their
role as the sole determiners of witness credibility. The vast majority of
the literature on the subject focuses on the psychological studies
regarding eyewitness identification. They involve analysis of studies
aimed at determining whether individuals are able to accurately store
and recall memories and what factors affect the reliability of those
memories. Furthermore, the legal literature debates these studies in
terms of their effectiveness in the courtroom, narrowing in on the way
juries perceive eyewitnesses and whether or not expert testimony can
7 ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
§ 22.03, at 1373 (5th ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
8 See infra Part III.A.
9 See infra Part IIL.B. But see United States v. Downs, 230 F.3d 272, 275 (7th Cir.
2000) ("Although 50 seconds may not sound like much, under conditions of great
stress they can pass quite slowly.").
10 See infra Part III.C.
11 PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-wrrNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 19 (1965).
12 Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing EuZABETH F. LorIus, EvEwrrNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)).
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alter that perception. However, these contributions, valuable as they
may be in attempting to understand the human mind, beg the ques-
tion of the appropriateness of their use in the American jury system.
Even if expert testimony "works," it does not follow that it is appropri-
ate. The aim of this Note is to explore the issue of expert testimony
on eyewitness testimony and procedural alternatives to experts. I
begin by reviewing the recent decision in United States v. Smith,
1.3
where the Middle District of Alabama addressed a circuit split regard-
ing the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 403. Part II then examines the history of the admissibility of
expert testimony generally, focusing on Supreme Court mandates and
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part III looks specifically at the way
courts have dealt with these mandates in the context of eyewitness-
identification experts and the relevant research presented therein.
Finally, Part IV details an argument against the use of experts to edu-
cate juries about the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony and exam-
ines procedural safeguards to prevent unreliable identifications.
I. UNITED STATES V. SMITH-A CASE STUDY
The facts in Smith are not unusual. Smith was arrested in connec-
tion with a bank robbery and several eyewitnesses placed him at the
scene.' 4 The defense presented Dr. Solomon Fulero as an expert wit-
ness to testify on the reliability of eyewitness testimony.' 5 After the
jury convicted Smith, the court wrote an opinion detailing its reasons
for allowing Dr. Fulero to testify, in part, because of a ten-year silence
by the Eleventh Circuit on the issue.
16
The district court began its discussion by detailing the "vast
lacuna between jurors' perceptions of the power of eyewitness testi-
mony and this testimony's accuracy."' 7 Citing a trend away from the
exclusion of expert testimony aimed to bridge that "lacuna,"18 the
court analyzed Dr. Fulero's proffer under the guidelines set by the
13 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (M.D. Ala. 2009), affd, 370 F. App'x 29 (11th Cir. 2010).
14 Id. at 1209.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 1210.
17 Id. at 1209-10. In making this conclusion, the court only cites studies of con-
victs exonerated by DNA testing and points out that they were convicted, at least in
part, by eyewitness testimony. This line of argument is fallacious, however, as it is
backward looking-it merely describes instances where identifications were wrong to
prove that juries are generally wrong. The former does not necessarily imply the
latter.
18 Id. at 1210-11.
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Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.19 First,
the court determined Dr. Fulero's methods were highly reliable and
generally accepted in the scientific community.20 Second, the court
responded to the government's objection that the testimony would
not "aid the jury" by noting that Eleventh Circuit precedent 21 never
addressed whether or not a district court abuses its discretion by
admitting the testimony.22 Specifically, Dr. Fulero testified regarding
four "specific factors that, according to well-established social science
research, impact witness accuracy and, as a result, might assist [the
trier of fact]" and were relevant to the facts of the case.23 Those fac-
tors are: reduced accuracy in cross-racial identifications, ways in which
stress can impair perception and memories, influences of postevent
information (two witnesses conversed after the incident), and the rela-
tionship between confidence in identification and its accuracy.
24
Finally, the court had to address whether the probative value of the
testimony was outweighed by other considerations. It was at this stage
in the inquiry that the court discovered a split among the circuits as to
whether eyewitness-identification expert testimony would violate the
Federal Rule of Evidence 25 requiring exclusion of evidence that would
confuse the jury, mislead the jury, or waste time.26 Satisfied that it
sufficiently limited Dr. Fulero's testimony to the areas where it would
"correct misguided intuitions and thereby preventjurors from making
common errors,"27 the court determined admission would be "quite
helpful in some cases."
28
II. EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS GOVERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY
The first major articulation of the standard used to judge the
admissibility of expert testimony was Frye v. United States.29 In that
case, government counsel sought to introduce evidence from a "sys-
19 509 U.S. 579 (1993). For a full discussion of this case, see infra Part II.
20 Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1212-13.
21 See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1357 (11th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
22 Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
23 Id. at 1215.
24 Id. at 1215-18.
25 FED. R. EVID. 403. For a full discussion of this Rule, see infra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text.
26 Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1219-20.
27 Id. at 1221.
28 Id. at 1222.
29 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2011]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tolic blood pressure deception test"30 that would be used to indicate
the level of truthfulness of the defendant. The court upheld the
exclusion of the testimony, articulating the standard that "the [scien-
tific principle or discovery] from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs."3' This principle set the standard
for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony for the next sev-
enty years.
In 1993, however, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Frye
test for expert witnesses in Daubert.32 There, the parents of minors
born with serious birth defects sued Merrell Dow alleging the
mother's ingestion of their drug-Bendectin-while pregnant caused
the defects. 33 The defense submitted an affidavit from a "well-creden-
tialed" physician and epidemiologist claiming that the drug was not
connected with the alleged birth defects and moved for summary
judgment.34 To survive the motion, the parents countered with eight
experts who argued that, based on studies done on animals and with
drugs containing a similar molecular structure, it was possible that the
drug could have caused the defects. 3 5 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment
under the Frye standard, concluding that Daubert's experts were inad-
missible as the science behind their conclusions was not "generally
accepted" in this context.36 The Supreme Court reversed, however,
holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the common
law standards for the admission of evidence and the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on the Frye test was inappropriate.
3 7
In rejecting Frye, the Supreme Court emphasized the critical role
of the district court judge in admitting the testimony and the signifi-
cant degree of deference those decisions are to be given. 38 Specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court grounded its framework in three Federal
Rules of Evidence: 104(a), 702, and 403. As an initial matter, pursu-
30 Id. at 1013. The theory behind this test, a crude precursor to the modem lie
detector test, it was explained, is that "truth is spontaneous, and comes without con-
scious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is
reflected in the blood pressure." Id. at 1014.
31 Id. at 114.
32 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 586-87 (1993).
33 Id. at 582.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 583.
36 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991).
37 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
38 Id. at 593.
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ant to his or her authority under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), 39 a
district court judge is given the power to make an initial determina-
tion of the proposed witness's qualifications. In exercising that power,
the judge, per Rule 702, is to evaluate two factors: (1) whether or not
the testimony pertains to "scientific knowledge" 40 and (2) whether it
will "assist the trier of fact. ' 41 In resolving the first prong of the test,
the Court explicitly abandoned Fye's "general acceptance" test and
made the inquiry much more flexible. 42 To ensure that there were
some cognizable limits on the admission of expert testimony, the
Court listed four inquiries to serve as a guide for lower court judges:
whether a theory or technique (1) uses the scientific method, 43 (2)
was subjected to peer review or publication," (3) had a known or
potential error rate,45 and (4) its reached a general level of accept-
ance in the community.46 These four criteria are not intended to
represent an exhaustive list of considerations, but only a baseline of
guidance.
47
The determination that an expert's subject of testimony meets a
standard of evidentiary reliability48 does not resolve the issue, as there
39 Id. at 592 n.10 ("Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a per-
son to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall
be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges." (quoting FED. R. EVID. 104(a))).
40 While the rule applies to "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge," the Court limited its discussion only to the "scientific" component, leaving
other areas for future litigation. Id. at 589.
41 The Rule currently reads in full:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EvD. 702.
42 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
43 Id. at 593.
44 Id. at 593-94.
45 Id. at 594.
46 Id. The survival of the "general acceptance" test is hardly surprising as it is a
very useful measure in evaluating the level of skepticism that should be accorded to a
given theory. However, what is critical is that it is not the only consideration. See id.
47 Id. at 593; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999)
(listing the factors from Daubert that a court may consider in determining
admissibility).
48 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
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must also be a fit with the facts of the case. In other words, there must
be a "valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precon-
dition to admissibility."49 In evaluating fit, the requirement is "'not
intended to be a high one' . . . and . . . unless otherwise specified,
'I[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible' and '[e]vidence which is not rel-
evant is not admissible.' -50 However, this does not mean that any ten-
uous connection to the facts of the case warrant admission, as the
Rule "clearly contemplates some degree of regulation."5 1 Specifically,
"when the layman juror would be able to make a common sense deter-
mination of the issue without the technical aid of such an expert, the
expert testimony should be excluded as superfluous."52 Exclusion
would also be justified in the case of evidence that wastes time or with
"'opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach. ' ' 53
Even in instances where juries may not have the "best possible knowl-
edge" of a subject, "to be a proper subject of expert testimony, proof
offered to add to their knowledge must present them with a system of
analysis that the court, in its discretion, can find reasonably likely to
add to common understanding of the particular issue before the
jury."
5 4
Finally, even if the testimony is found to be both scientifically reli-
able and it fits the facts of the case, a trial judge may opt for exclusion
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 on the grounds that "its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." 55 In determining whether to exclude evidence under this
Rule, the court is to look at the testimony in the light most favorable
to the proponent.56 Courts have interpreted this rule to generally
49 Id. at 591-92. The Court uses an apt analogy: while the study of the phases of
the moon is useful in determining whether or not it is dark outside, it is not relevant
science in establishing whether or not an individual was unusually unlikely to behave
irrationally on that night. Id. at 591.
50 United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2001) (third and fourth
alterations in original) (citing FED. R. EVID. 402; Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. 137).
51 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
52 United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996).
53 Id. (citing FED. R. EviD. 702).
54 United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (referring specifically
to lay jurors' "knowledge of the organic and behavioral mechanisms of perception
and memory").
55 FED. R. EVID. 403.
56 See United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1979).
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favor admissibility.5 7 The Supreme Court indicated as much when
they noted that exclusion is not necessarily the best method: "Vigor-
ous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropri-
ate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."58
The last component of the current jurisprudence on expert testi-
mony admissibility was formulated in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.
5 9
The right rear tire of Patrick Carmichael's minivan blew out, killing
one passenger and injuring several others.6° In a diversity action
against the tire manufacturer, Carmichael submitted a deposition of
Dennis Carlson, an expert in tire-failure analysis. 61 The district court
granted summary judgment to Kumho, holding that under the flexi-
ble Daubert factors Carlson's proposed testimony was unreliable.
62
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that Daubert explicitly applied
only to "scientific context[s]" and that Carlson's testimony instead
relied "on skill- or experience-based observation" which rendered
Daubert inapplicable. 63 In resolving this disagreement, the Supreme
Court began by pointing out that the language of Rule 702 makes no
distinction between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other
specialized" knowledge.64 The thrust of the Daubert decision, they
found, was that the critical word in establishing reliability was "knowl-
edge" and not the modifying words. 65 The Court indicated it was the
57 See, e.g., United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[Rule]
403 favors admissibility, while concomitantly providing the means of keeping distract-
ing evidence out of the trial."); United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 797 (8th Cir.
1980) ("In weighing the probative value of evidence against the dangers and consider-
ations enumerated in Rule 403, the general rule is that the balance should be struck
in favor of admission."); United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979)
("Unless trials are to be conducted on scenarios, on unreal facts tailored and sanitized
for the occasion, the application of Rule 403 must be cautious and sparing. Its major
function is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative probative force, drag-
ged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.").
58 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). For a discus-
sion of the viability of this statement, see infra Part IV.F.
59 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
60 Id. at 142.
61 Id.
62 Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1521-22 (S.D. Ala.
1996).
63 Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435-36 (11th Cir. 1997).
64 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 146.
65 Id. at 147. This is supported by the Court's observation that "it would prove
difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a
gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction between 'scientific' knowledge
and 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge." Id. at 148.
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relationship between the knowledge of the expert and the knowledge
of the jury that mattered most:
And whether the specific expert testimony focuses upon specialized
observations, the specialized translation of those observations into
theory, a specialized theory itself, or the application of such a theory
in a particular case, the expert's testimony often will rest "upon an
experience confessedly foreign in kind to [the jury's] own."
66
Having extended the Daubert criteria to all types of specialized
knowledge, the Court went on to emphasize the importance of the
role of the district court judge as "gatekeeper."67 The primary job of
the district court judge in these cases is to ensure that the expert
"employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."68 While
it is extremely important that the district court have wide latitude in
determining what is reliable, they too must have the freedom to deter-
mine how to test that reliability. 69 In accord with this mandate, the
appellate courts are to review decisions to exclude expert testimony
under an "abuse of discretion" standard.
70
Daubert did away with the "general acceptance" test, raising the
bar for the admission of expert testimony. To be admitted, counsel
must, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, convince the judge, acting
as "gatekeeper," that the science or other specialized knowledge
behind the expert testimony is both valid and will be helpful to the
jury. Even if the judge is satisfied both of these requirements are met,
the testimony may still be excluded if its probative value is outweighed
by other considerations of prejudice, undue delay, or waste of time.
Since Daubert, judges have been more likely to scrutinize expert testi-
66 Id. at 149 (quoting Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regard-
ing Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901)).
67 Id. at 148.
68 Id. at 152.
69 Id.
70 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("We hold, therefore,
that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which to review a district court's
decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence."). "It is well-established that 'the
trial judge has broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion of expert
evidence, and his action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous.'" Boucher v.
U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Salem v. U.S. Lines
Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962)). This level of deference also applies to review of deci-
sions grounded in Rule 403: "[A] trial court is in a far better position than an appel-
late court to strike the sensitive balance dictated by Rule 403. When a trial court
engages in such a balancing process and articulates on the record the rationale for its
conclusion, its conclusion should rarely be disturbed." Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967
F.2d 912, 917-18 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
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mony before trial and then limit or exclude the testimony.71 Whether
or not this has improved the quality of expert testimony remains to be
seen. 7
2
II. EYE DocroRs: EXPERT TESTIMONY ON
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
While Frye, Daubert, Kumho, and their progeny all deal with the
admissibility of expert witnesses generally, the focus of this Note is the
subset of cases dealing specifically with the application of these rules
to issues surrounding eyewitness identification. This Part will begin by
reviewing the history of appellate jurisprudence on this issue. Then,
using three of the phenomenon identified in United States v. Smith73 as
a backdrop, I will examine the current split among the circuits, focus-
ing on the concerns courts have expressed in favor of and against
admission.
Defense attorneys first introduced expert testimony regarding
eyewitness identifications in the 1970s as a way to counter the per-
ceived misunderstandings juries had about the functioning of human
perception.74 The first case to squarely address this issue was the 1973
case of United States v. AmaraL75 The defendant was convicted of bank
robbery, in part due to testimony from eyewitnesses placing him at the
scene. 76 On appeal, Amaral argued that the district court erred in
refusing to admit testimony from Dr. Bertram Raven, who was to tes-
tify about the effects of stress and the general unreliability of eyewit-
ness testimony. 77 Specifically, the district court excluded the evidence
because "it would not be appropriate to take from the jury their own
determination as to what weight or effect to give to the evidence of
the eye-witness and identifying witnesses and to have that determina-
tion put before them on the basis of the expert witness testimony as
proffered." 78 Noting that the "basic purpose of any proffered evi-
dence is to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge by the triers of fact
71 See Margaret A. Berger, Wat Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 Am. J. PUB.
HEALTH S59, S64-65 (Supp. I 2005) (noting increased scrutiny); Carol Krafka et al.,
Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal
Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 309, 310 (2002) (comparing results of surveys
of the beliefs and practice of attorneys and judges before and after Daubert).
72 See Berger, supra note 71, at S64 (citing the need for more research).
73 See discussion supra Part I.
74 See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2000).
75 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
76 Id. at 1150-51.
77 Id. at 1153.
78 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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thus enabling them to reach a final determination," 79 the Ninth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's decision to exclude the testimony.
80
Indicating strong disfavor concerning the use of expert evaluation of
witnesses, the court specifically pointed to the power of cross-examina-
tion as the primary mechanism for the "ascertainment of truth."81
Cross-examination, the court argued, can readily be used to uncover
stressful aspects of the encounter and cast: doubt on the ability of the
witness to truly remember the identity of the criminal.8 2 Ruling on
these grounds, the court declined to address whether or not the sci-
ence was "generally accepted"83 or if the testimony would confuse the
jury or lead to undue delays.8 4 The skepticism regarding expert testi-
mony was widely held by courts during the 1970s and early 1980s.85
Since Amaral, courts have explored a variety of justifications for
the admission or denial of expert testimony, yielding mixed results.
An often discussed factor in ruling on admissibility is the scientific
validity of the theories. 86 Some courts have found there is agreement
in the field as to the validity of the theories, 7 while others have not.
88
In an attempt to resolve the question of "general acceptance," a survey
was conducted in 1989 of sixty-three experts in the field to determine
79 Id. at 1152.
80 Id. at 1153.
81 Id.
82 Id. But see United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986) (Fer-
guson,J., dissenting) ("The key to the Amaral holding is that panel's conclusion this
information may be obtained by cross-examination. However, cross-examination can-
not uncover the reasons for misidentification because the witness honestly does not
believe he or she has misidentified the defendant."); People v. Smith, 743 N.Y.S.2d
246, 252 (Sup. Ct. 2002) ("Cross-examination, as suggested by Amaral... [is] not [a]
substitute[ ] for expert testimony offered by the defense.").
83 Amara 488 F.2d at 1153.
84 Id. at 1154. These factors cited by this case would become codified two years
later in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403; supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
85 See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2000).
86 While there are numerous "theories" advanced by cognitive psychologists, the
appellate courts often deal generally with the expert's testimony, rather than dealing
with the validity of each individual theory. This Note, however, will address many of
them specifically. See infra Part 1II.A-C.
87 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The day
may have arrived.. . when Dr. Fulero's testimony can be said to conform to a gener-
ally accepted explanatory theory.").
88 See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding
offer of proof did not make clear that "[the] testimony ... would be based upon a




their views on a variety of factors present in eyewitness identification.89
The researchers asked the experts for their evaluation of twenty-one
different topics.90 Then they used these responses to determine
whether or not that topic was reliable enough to be presented in a
courtroom, if they themselves would feel comfortable testifying, if they
have testified, and if they believed the subject was "common sense" for
a jury.91 Given that the Frye test for general acceptance did not con-
tain a baseline of exactly what percentage constituted acceptance, the
researchers broke the findings into categories. Specifically, if an
agreement rate of eighty percent were required, they concluded that
the following areas were admissible: "the wording of questions, lineup
instructions, the effects of misleading postevent information, the accu-
racy-confidence correlation, attitudes and expectations, exposure
time, unconscious transference, showups, and the forgetting curve."
92
However, "the effects of stress, hypnosis, weapon focus, trained observ-
ers, event violence, and the cross-racial bias among Black witnesses did
not elicit high degrees of consensus." 93 However, the existence of
some level of agreement does not necessarily imply that the expert
should be allowed to testify to that point. In United States v. Rincon,
94
the court was presented with this study in defense counsel's motion to
allow an expert witness.95 Despite the study's conclusions, the court
upheld the exclusion of testimony on the grounds that the study
merely presented the communities' opinions on each topic but did
not satisfactorily demonstrate the reliability underlying the conclu-
sions to meet the Daubert requirements. 96 In fact, even the authors of
the study did not necessarily believe expert witnesses were the right
solution: "Finally, our results should not be taken to imply that using
psychological experts is the best possible solution for the problems
arising from eyewitness testimony."
97
Despite the uncertainty previously exhibited, the trend is moving
toward recognition of the validity of the cognitive sciences. Kassin et
89 Saul M. Kassin et al., The "General Acceptance" of Psychological Research on Eyewit-
ness Testimony: A Survey of the Experts, 44 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 1089, 1090 (1989).
90 For a complete discussion of their methodology, see id. at 1090-92.
91 Id. at 1094 tbl.4.
92 Id. at 1095.
93 Id. at 1096. A "high degree of consensus" refers to an approval rate of seventy-
five percent or higher. See id. at 1095.
94 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994).
95 The article was submitted to buttress their original motion, which was littered
with unsupported claims and phrases like "[t] here is a wealth of knowledge support-
ing this point" and "[t]he research is clear." Id. at 924 (quoting defendant's motion).
96 Id. at 924-25.
97 Kassin et al., supra note 89, at 1097.
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al.'s survey was updated in 2001, expanding the number of phenome-
non to thirty.98 This time, with an agreement rate of at least eighty
percent,9 9 the experts agreed upon the reliability of all of the same
topics, plus: confidence malleability, mug shot-induced bias, child
witness suggestibility, hypnotic suggestibility, alcoholic intoxication,
the cross-race bias, and weapon focus.'00 Faced with significant sup-
port in the scientific community for the reliability of studies indicting
the reliability of eyewitness testimony and nearly forty years of
research post-Amaral, courts have increasingly relied on justifications
other than "reliability" when excluding expert testimony.
10'
Even if cognitive psychology research into eyewitness testimony is
generally found to be reliable, the critical question is what topics spe-
cifically courts have allowed the experts to discuss. In performing
their role as gatekeeper, the district court judge is required to ensure
that reliable testimony is given only in so far as it "assists the trier of
fact."102 The primary point of disagreement among the circuits is the
extent to which the assistance expert testimony may provide to the
jury is outweighed by other considerations. On one extreme, the Sev-
enth Circuit holds: "[E]xpert testimony regarding the potential
hazards of eyewitness identification-regardless of its reliability-'will
not aid the jury because it addresses an issue of which the jury already
98 Saul M. Kassin et al., On the "General Acceptance" of Eyewitness Testimony Research:
A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsr 405, 408 (2001).
99 For a criticism of the methodology of this study, see Daniel B. Wright, Causal
and Associative Hypothesis in Psychology, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'v & L. 190, 206-08
(2006). Wright argues that many of the experts responding to the survey may not
have appreciated the differences between phenomena framed in "causal" terms
rather than "associative" terms, resulting in a risk of confusion. "Therefore, caution is
advised before using these results to argue that each of their survey statements is
generally accepted unless there is certainty that the respondents interpreted that par-
ticular survey statement appropriately." Id. at 208.
100 See Kassin et al., supra note 98, at 412 tbl.4. The last two phenomena (the
cross-race bias and weapon focus) previously did not command a high degree of con-
sensus. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
101 See United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1103 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the
Seventh Circuit's "presumption against admission of expert testimony on eyewitness
identification stemmed from our concerns about whether such expert testimony
would actually assist the trier of fact, rather than about its reliability"); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2000) ("This jurisprudential
trend is not surprising in light of modern scientific studies which show that, while
juries rely heavily on eyewitness testimony, it can be untrustworthy under certain cir-
cumstances."); United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1212 (M.D. Ala. 2009)
("[O]ther courts have specifically reviewed Dr. Fulero's methods and found that they
'easily' satisfy the first Daubert inquiry.").
102 FED. R. EVID. 702.
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generally is aware, and it will not contribute to their understanding' of
the particular factual issues posed.' 1 0 3 At the other end is the Third
Circuit:
The court was convinced at trial that the psychological research
supporting the above four subjects is both reliable and helpful and
that the constantly increasing knowledge social scientists are
obtaining about the inner workings of the human animal are likely
not commonly understood or obviously apparent to jurors (or, for
that matter, judges). Therefore, educating the jury about this
research does not (and, in this case, did not) run afoul of Rule 702,
and, indeed, it is an important step along the road to using
improved scientific knowledge to create more accurate and fair
legal proceedings. It would be anachronistic to categorically bar
courts from employing the latest reliable scientific evidence in their
effort to make sure that the trials that they administer resemble as
closely as possible a search for truth; such a search requires dili-
gently pursuing better understandings of human decisionmaking,
including the flaws, weaknesses, and biases that characterize human
life. Particularly for cases like this one, in which the reliability of
eyewitness testimony is so important and so linked to well-estab-
lished flaws in human perception and memory, such testimony may
be crucial to fair, thorough, informed, and rigorous decisionmak-
ing. It can only help to make factfinders more informed. Applying
this research to the facts of this case, however, is within the sole
province of the jury.
10 4
To resolve this dispute, it is necessary to look to the specific theories
advanced by experts and how the circuits have treated them.
A review of cases from the courts of appeals reveals three specific
eyewitness identification phenomena'0 5 that experts have been
allowed to testify about with increasing frequency: the correlation
between confidence in identification and accuracy, the effect of stress
on identification, and cross-racial identifications. The confidence/
accuracy relationship and cross-racial identifications have been
deemed reliable enough to be presented in court, as determined by
experts in the field. 10 6 However, there is certainly no consensus
among the circuits on any of these issues.
103 United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964, 971 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 1989)).
104 Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1218-19.
105 Other phenomena have been admitted by courts: the impact of postevent phe-
nomena, the impact of prior photographic identification, and weapon focus. The
emphasis here, however, will be on the most commonly raised areas of expert
testimony.
106 See Kassin et al., supra note 98, at 412 tbl.4.
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A. The Relationship Between Confidence and Accuracy
The area of expert testimony most commonly raised by defense
counsel is the relationship between confidence in an identification
and the probability that it is accurate. Research on the issue over-
whelmingly reveals that the confidence exhibited by an individual in
identifying someone correlates very poorly with the probability that
the identification is, in fact, accurate. 10 7 Furthermore, those who
make up juries are arguably unduly persuaded by an eyewitness's
expression of confidence. 10 8 In United States v. Mathis,10 9 the Third
Circuit addressed the issue of allowing an expert to testify to "rebut
the natural assumption that [the witness's] strong expression of confi-
dence indicates an unusually reliable identification."' 10 In evaluating
the prongs of the Daubert test, the court first noted that the govern-
ment had conceded the qualifications of the expert and the reliability
of his conclusions.'11 Turning their attention to the "fit" require-
ment, the court responded to the government's objection that the tes-
timony was "nothing more than a general thesis,"11 2 by looking to the
cross-examination of the witness, where he explicitly indicated he was
"positive" he saw the defendant.113 There was, the court found,
unquestionably a fit between the witness's expression and expert testi-
mony that would appropriately rebut the facts.' 14 In contrast, when
107 See Steven G. Fox & H.A. Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert
Testimony and Eyewitness Confidence upon Mock Juror Judgment, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
215, 224-27 (1986).
108 See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T] here is almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the
stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says 'That's the one!'" (quoting LorrUs,
supra note 12, at 19)).
109 264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001).
110 United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1400 (3d Cir. 1991).
111 Mathis, 264 F.3d at 335.
112 Id. at 337 (quoting Brief of Appellee at 44, Mathis, 264 F.3d 321 (No. 99-
5940)).
113 The cross-examination went as follows:
Q: [A]s we sit here today, is it even possible that the identification you made
of Mr. Mathis in that photo array was based not on seeing him exiting that
Jeep but on the previous opportunity to observe that photograph.
A: No, I'm positive by him getting out of the vehicle ....
Q: Your answer is it's not even a possibility?
A: I guess there is a remote possibility, but I'm positive of the identification
when he exited the vehicle.
Id. (alterations in original).
114 However, despite finding an abuse of discretion in failing to admit the testi-
mony, the court did not remand because a variety of other types of evidence rendered
the abuse harmless error. Id. at 343-44.
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faced with the same proffer, the Seventh Circuit has routinely upheld
district courts' determinations that the evidence would not assist the
trier of fact, 115 even while granting its reliability.
116
B. The Relationship Between Stress and Memory Storage
Similar in frequency to the confidence/accuracy phenomena are
attempts to admit testimony regarding the relationship between stress
and accuracy in identification. In most instances, eyewitnesses in fed-
eral trials were present at the time of the alleged crime, either as the
victims or bystanders. During these encounters, the witness was
potentially endangered by the criminal and was under conditions of
great stress. Some courts have found that this element of eyewitness
testimony is appropriate for elucidation by an expert"17 because most
jurors believe that stress heightens a person's sense and memory
recall,11 8 while studies show the opposite effect. 119 Numerous other
courts, however, continue to exclude the evidence, trusting that the
jury is aware of any possible implications of stress120 and even if they
are not, that utilizing cross-examination12 1 or limiting jury instruc-
tions will correct misconceptions. 22 It is, however, worth noting, that
115 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1106 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]his
Court has consistently affirmed district court decisions rejecting expert testimony per-
taining to the reliability of eyewitness identifications on the basis that it will not 'assist
the trier of fact' under Rule 702 . . "); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051
(7th Cir. 1992) (noting the same).
116 See, e.g., Hall, 165 F.3d at 1104-05 (upholding the district court's exclusion of
expert testimony even while observing its potential helpfulness); Curry, 977 F.2d at
1051-52 ("The district court also apparently had no quarrel with [the expert's] com-
petency to testify or with the reliability of her scientific testimony.").
117 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1397 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting
the district court's decision to allow stress-related expert testimony); United States v.
Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1216-19 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (noting the utility of expert
testimony on the effect of stress on eyewitness).
118 See generally D.S. Greer, Anything but the Truth? The Reliability of Testimony in
Criminal Trials, 11 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 131, 134-35 (1971) (relating simulation
experiment).
119 See C. Neil Macrae et al., Creating Memory Illusions: Expectancy-Based Processing
and the Generation of False Memories, 10 MEMORY 63, 72 (2002).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Such
expert testimony will not aid the jury because it addresses an issue of which the jury
generally is aware.").
121 See, e.g., Hal 165 F.3d at 1107 ("[A]ny weakness in eyewitness identification
testimony ordinarily can be exposed through careful cross-examination of the
eywtinesses.").
122 See, e.g., id. ("[T]he district court properly gave the jury an instruction on the
reliability of eyewitness identification to aid the jury in evaluating the eyewitness iden-
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in neither survey conducted by Kassin et al. 123 was stress rated with a
high level of agreement as reliable enough to be presented in
court.124 Furthermore, of experts surveyed in 2001, only half said they
would even testify on the subject.1
25
C. The Relationship Between Race and Identification
Ninety percent of experts agreed that research regarding errors
in cross-racial identifications were reliable enough to be presented. 126
In situations where an individual of one race is asked to identify mem-
bers of another race, that person is 1.56 times more likely to be mis-
taken than if the identification was of an individual of the same
race. 127 Because of these problems, the Third and Sixth Circuits have
admitted expert testimony to educate the jury. 128 For the same ratio-
nale as the exclusion of expert testimony regarding stress, 129 the Sev-
enth and Ninth have specifically excluded the testimony.
130
The number of phenomena circuit courts have either affirmed
the admission of or found abuse of discretion in denying is far out-
numbered by the number of instances they have had the occasion to
affirm the exclusion. For example, courts have consistently excluded
expert testimony regarding the ways in which memory is formu-
tification testimony introduced at trial."); United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 925
(9th Cir. 1994) (noting the sufficiency of the district court's limiting instruction).
The decision to exclude in Rincon was based primarily on the failure of defense coun-
sel to present robust scientific findings supporting their conclusion. See id. at 924-25.
123 See supra notes 93, 99-100 and accompanying text.
124 In fact, the level of support decreased from seventy-one percent in 1989 to sixty
percent in 2001. Kassin et al., supra note 98, at 413 tbl.5.
125 Id. at 412 tbl.4.
126 Id.
127 Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-
Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 15
(2001).
128 See United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1401 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that
the district court abused its discretion for not allowing such testimony); United States
v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding problems associated with cross-
racial identifications outside ofjury's "ken," but ultimately concluding that the exclu-
sion was harmless).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Smith
... was successful in getting the district court to instruct the jury about cross-racial
identification .... ").
130 See supra notes 101, 103 and accompanying text.
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lated, 13 1 the suggestiveness of pretrial procedures, 32 the impact of
drugs and alcohol on perception, 133 and the effect of viewing time.1
3 4
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the way the
courts of appeals have dealt with each individual identification phe-
nomenon. First, appellate courts uniformly grant a great degree of
deference to the district court regardless of whether the testimony is
admitted or excluded. 135 In only one case has an appellate court
found an abuse of discretion that was not harmless error. 136 Second,
the common theme running through the theories courts have admit-
ted is that they are based upon "an experience confessedly foreign ...
to [the jury's] own."1 3 7 Rather than admitting anything that may pos-
sibly be of some use to the jury, courts instead focus on those areas
where juries are believed to have incorrect biases and where an expert
may present findings that the jury can then apply to the facts more
accurately. Third, the relatively counterintuitive nature of a particular
conclusion is a strong indicator of its likelihood of admission. Finally,
the magnitude of the eyewitness's testimony in the overall case against
the defendant is one of the most important factors in deciding
whether or not to allow experts to testify. While the existence of other
incriminating evidence does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of
expert testimony, 138 in instances where the government's entire case
rested upon identification by an uncorroborated eyewitness made
under suspect conditions, then expert testimony may be relevant.1 39
131 See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding the
jury needed no illumination); United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.
1987) (holding that such testimony could prejudice the jury).
132 See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1104 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that
"a district judge has broad discretion to exclude relevant evidence that is confusing or
redundant").
133 See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The
intrusion of an expert to comment on . . . minor [eyewitness] testimony was not
necessary.").
134 See, e.g., Hall 165 F.3d at 1104 (excluding expert testimony on the effect of
viewing time on memory).
135 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
136 See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 318 (6th Cir. 2000) (remanding for
failure to conduct a clear Daubert analysis).
137 See Hand, supra note 66, at 54.
138 Failure to admit the expert testimony on several topics was found to be an
abuse of discretion in United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321 (3d Cir. 2001), despite
evidence of a high speed chase, which ended in a passenger dropping a black bag
containing money, testimony from the defendant's cohort in the bank robbery, and
video footage from the bank. Id. at 321, 325, 341-42.
139 See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1987).
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IV. THE CASE FOR EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
In spite of the frailties of the human mind exhibited in memory
recall and the potential for illumination by experts, this Part argues
that the use of expert testimony is a legally inappropriate solution.
First, I discuss the theoretical value of expert testimony and its practi-
cal effect on juries. Next, I review the possible grounds for exclusion,
identifying the strongest support for the argument. Finally, alterna-
tive, procedural methods of caution will be explored.
A. The Ecological Fallacy
The cornerstone of our system remains our belief in the wisdom
and integrity of the jury system and the ability of twelve jurors to
determine the accuracy of witnesses' testimony.1
40
Numerous psychologists argue that expert testimony is a neces-
sary tool to counteract incorrect jury assumptions. 141 By explaining
to juries the ways, according to research, that human brains store and
recall memories and by debunking common misconceptions about
that process, these psychologists believe that juries will be better
equipped to make determinations about the reliability of individual
eyewitness identifications. The end result, they argue, will be fewer
wrongful convictions and more reliable jury verdicts. Whether or not
this is the case, however, remains an open question. Several assump-
tions behind this argument cast doubt on its validity.
Consider an analogy from baseball. Billy Butler of my beloved
Kansas City Royals is up to bat. The count is three balls and two
strikes. On the next pitch, the umpire calls a strike and after expres-
sing his disagreement with a few choice expletives, Billy storms off to
the dugout. Without video review or instant replay to undoubtedly
prove if the pitch was a ball or a strike, how can we determine who was
right-the batter who claims he saw the pitch go outside, or the
umpire who swears it was right down the middle? In 2009, approxi-
mately eighteen percent of all major league plate appearances ended
in a called strike three and the walk rate was just under nine per-
cent. 142 One might assume that, in attempting to ascertain the true
location of a single pitch, the fact that eighteen percent of all plate
appearances ended with strike three called is a relevant piece of infor-
140 People v. Plasencia, 189 Cal. Rptr. 804, 807 (Ct. App. 1983).
141 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
142 1 calculated these figures using the calculator on Custom Statistic Report: League
Batting, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS, http://www.baseballprospectus.com/statistics/sorta-
ble/index.php?cid=75007 (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
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mation that can be used to discount the probability that the umpire
was right. However, that would be incorrect.
This assumption falls victim to the ecological fallacy. First intro-
duced in 1950 by statistician W.S. Robinson, the ecological fallacy is a
statistical error of interpretation where a particular characteristic of
the population as a whole is applied to an individual.1 43 Rather than
providing valuable insight into the actions of an individual, "the only
reasonable assumption is that an ecological correlation is almost cer-
tainly not equal to its corresponding individual correlation."
144
Robinson's theory has been used in a variety of ways: to show that
while there was a positive correlation between the illiteracy rate and
the proportion of a population of individuals born outside of the
United States, the individual immigrant was actually more literate than
his or her America-born counterpart; 145 to demonstrate that while
Democratic candidates often won wealthier states, wealthier individu-
als were more likely to vote Republican; 146 and to help in challenging
Washington state's 2004 gubernatorial election. 147 In the baseball sce-
nario, attempting to discern whether or not the "sweet swing[ing]"
148
Butler was truly struck out by reference to the number of strikeouts in
the population of baseball players is fallacious. Robinson is careful to
caution: "While it is theoretically possible for the two to be equal, the
conditions under which this can happen are far removed from those
ordinarily encountered in data."
4 9
In the context of eyewitness-identification testimony, the same
argument holds true. As in baseball, there is no instant replay in real
life. Even assuming the studies are entirely reliable and scientifically
accurate, placing an expert on the stand and presenting the findings
to a jury runs the risk of the ecological fallacy. Presenting testimony
that humans typically have a hard time remembering faces under con-
ditions of great stress or in the presence of a weapon tells the jury
143 W.S. Robinson, Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals, 15 Am. Soc.
REv. 351, 357 (1950).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 354-57.
146 See ANDREW GELMAN, RED STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE, POOR STATE 25
(2008).
147 See Transcript of Oral Decision at 15-17, Borders v. King Cnty., No. 05-2-00027-
3 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2005).
148 Kevin Kaduk, Spring Snapshot: Royals Resting All of Their Hopes on Three Kings, BIG
LEAGUE STEW (Mar. 21, 2010, 10:07 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/blog/big-
league-stew/post/Spring-Snapshot-Royals-resting-all-of-their-hop?urn=mlb-229216.
149 Robinson, supra note 143, at 357.
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nothing about the individual case of each witness in the trial.15 0 Not only
that, but such expert testimony runs the very real risk that juries will
take that testimony to mean precisely what it does not-that the wit-
nesses they are asked to evaluate are identically susceptible to frailties
of memory.
A likely response to this argument is that the expert is not com-
menting on an individual, but rather educating the jury about the lat-
est psychological literature. The court made this argument in Smith,
clarifying that "the expert was not permitted to testify about the credi-
bility and believability of the witnesses in this case. ' 15 1 The court
approves of this process because it is designed solely to educate the
jury, not to tell them how to evaluate a witness's credibility. The
expert is testifying not about people, per se, but rather about the func-
tioning of the brain. In this sense, the expert is the proper subject for
examination because testimony regarding brain functioning is no less
foreign than drug interactions or other similarly complex and special-
ized knowledge. This argument is entirely disingenuous. While the
expert is technically precluded from speaking directly about any par-
ticular witness, they are doing exactly that-their testimony is akin to
asking the jury to consider an ecologically fallacious conclusion.
B. The Usurpation of the Role of the Jury
In a criminal trial, because they have the burden of proof, the
prosecution presents its case first.152 During this portion of the trial,
the prosecution will present one or more eyewitnesses to persuade the
jurors that the defendant committed the crime. After this testimony,
the defense will call an expert to comment on preapproved areas of
research. The expert will testify about all of the factors present in the
case, such as stress, confidence, and cross-racial issues, because all
other factors that do not "fit"'5 3 will have been specifically excluded in
the pretrial Daubert hearing. The Second Circuit eloquently
explained:
Fundamental to the role ofjuror as trier of fact is the task of assess-
ing witness credibility. And, a witness's demeanor on the stand,
150 Similarly, studies about the knowledge and biases of jurors say nothing about
the knowledge and biases of individual jurors.
151 United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1218 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
152 See PAUL BERGMAN & SARAH J. BERMAN, THE CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK 469-70
(Richard Stim ed., 11th ed. 2009).
153 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993) (requiring a




including his or her confidence, impacts the assessment of credibil-
ity. By testifying that confidence bears little or no relationship to
accuracy in identifications, [the expert witness] would effectively
have inserted his own view of the officers' credibility for that of the
jurors, thereby usurping their role.
154
Allowing expert testimony usurps this fundamental role of the
jury. The "ultimate issue" rule refers to allowing a witness the latitude
to answer a question that would indicate that witness's opinion of the
final determination to be made in the trial.1 55 In other words, a phar-
macology expert may testify regarding her research into drug interac-
tions, but she is barred from taking the final step and testifying that
the particular drug in a particular instance caused the alleged injury.
The last step, so the argument goes, is the "ultimate issue" and the
sole province of the jury. Despite the critics' response that the ulti-
mate issue argument has been "specifically abolished" by the Federal
Rules of Evidence,1 56 this abolition is not applicable. Expert testi-
mony, as here conceptualized, is distinguishable because it allows one
witness to tell the jury how they should evaluate another witness, as
opposed to their giving their opinion on the outcome of the case. In
criminal cases involving eyewitnesses, the "ultimate issue" is whether
the defendant perpetrated the crime. Allowing a witness to speak
about general studies, and using this information to later imply that
another witness is unbelievable and unreliable, is a different issue alto-
gether. The testimony is forbidden because "[i] t is the exclusive prov-
ince of the jury to determine the believability of [a] witness. An
expert is not permitted to offer an opinion as to the believability or
truthfulness of a victim's story."157 Forbidding the expert from dis-
cussing the particular witnesses in a case, as happened in Smith, does
not avoid usurping the role of the jury. In the course of the trial, the
eyewitness will have testified before the expert, and the jurors will
have each listened to her testimony, observed her demeanor, and
individually passed judgment about her credibility. The expert then
154 United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999).
155 See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 153 P.2d 720, 724 (Cal. 1944) (whether abortion was
necessary to save life of patient); Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 166
N.E.2d 582, 585 (111. 1960) (medical causation); Dowling v. L.H. Shattuck, Inc., 17
A.2d 529, 532 (N.H. 1941) (proper method of shoring ditch); Schweiger v. Solbeck,
230 P.2d 195, 203 (Or. 1951) (cause of landslide).
156 See FED. R. EVID. 704(a); United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1183 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., dissenting); 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRLmtS AT
COMMON LAW § 1920, at 18 (James H. Chadboum ed., rev. ed. 1978) (dismissing
claim as a "mere bit of empty rhetoric").
157 Bachman v. Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
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testifies about no one in particular, but only about studies of the way
the mind works. If the expert is to have any impact at all, the jurors
will necessarily reduce their perception of the believability of individ-
ual witnesses based on the expert's general testimony. 158 "When an
expert undertakes to tell the jury what result to reach, this does not
aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute the
expert's judgment for the jury's."
I 59
C. Battle of the Experts
Testimony by dueling experts can result in a jury that is worse off
than if no expert were presented. As the results of the most recent
surveys taken by Kassin et al. indicate, it is evident that there is not
universal agreement as to the reliability or admissibility of any of the
surveyed phenomena of identification.' 60 If expert testimony is prof-
fered by the defense to expose certain phenomena, it stands to reason
that there will be experts who disagree with the study's methodology
or conclusions that could be presented by the prosecution. Conflict-
ing testimony from two experts creates significant potential for jury
confusion about the science behind identification and results in their
improperly discounting the entire line of testimony. 161 A recent study
conducted by Lora M. Levett and Margaret Bull Kovera buttressed the
conclusion that "It]he defense expert witness sensitized the jurors to
the factors that affect eyewitness reliability; however, adding the
opposing expert caused jurors to become more skeptical of the eyewit-
ness identification than jurors who heard no opposing expert, regard-
less of the condition under which the witness viewed the crime."'
62
When juries are presented with complicated scientific evidence that
they may not understand, they engage in heuristic processing in which
they begin to weigh other, less complicated factors rather than the
158 Compare Michael McCloskey & Howard E. Egeth, Eyewitness Identification: What
Can a Psychologist Tell a Jury?, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 550, 550 (1983) (arguing that
while jurors need help, they do not need to be made more skeptical of eyewitnesses),
with Edith Greene & Elizabeth Loftus, Solving the Eyewitness Problem, 2 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
395, 404 (1984) (concluding that use of experts is beneficial, if not necessary).
159 United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994).
160 Kassin et al., supra note 98, at 412 tbi.4.
161 See Lora M. Levett & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing Expert
Witnesses for Educating Jurors About Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
363, 370 (2008).
162 Id. (emphasis added).
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quality of the argument.16 Furthermore, jurors may view a battle of
the experts as indicating the science is not generally accepted, even if
that is not the reality. 164 The judge, acting as gatekeeper, 16 5 has the
obligation to ensure that any expert that is permitted to testify is
doing so regarding science that is generally reliable, helpful to the
jury, and not overly prejudicial. As seen in the lack of universal agree-
ment amongst experts in the field, a theory's general acceptance does
not necessarily imply its correctness or universal acceptance. "Unlike
opposing clinical testimony, in which a conclusion is in debate ....
opposing-eyewitness expert testimony more typically debates the value
and relevance of research on eyewitness memory." 16 6 When there are
not valid grounds for wholesale exclusion of opposing expert testi-
mony, there is a risk that the battle of the experts will leave the witness
by the wayside and result in the jury incorrectly discounting the entire
body of testimony.
167
D. Undue Influence of Experts
Even assuming jurors are generally unaware of the frailties of the
mind, there is a significant risk that they will place undue weight on
the testimony of an individual labeled an "expert." This view has been
expressed on numerous occasions by the circuit courts: "Given the
powerful nature of expert testimony, coupled with its potential to mis-
lead the jury, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding
that the proffered evidence would not assist the trier of fact and that it
was likely to mislead the jury."168 In a study of 128 university stu-
163 See id. at 365 ("An opposing expert could act as a heuristic cue that makes
jurors skeptical of all scientific evidence, regardless of whether the expert attempts to
educate the jury about scientific concepts.").
164 See id. at 371.
165 See FED. R. EVrD. 104(a).
166 BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION 246 (1995).
167 This argument presents somewhat of a catch-22. On the one hand, if the
opposing expert testimony is really very strong, then there may be grounds for exclud-
ing all expert testimony, as the science is not very reliable. On the other, if both sides
present viable arguments, grounded in good science-as appears to be most often the
case-the court would be obliged to allow both sets of testimony, resulting in a battle
of the experts.
168 United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 1994); see also United States
v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2001) ("The aura of reliability that's attached to
an expert witness, I believe, is significant. Listening to this expert, it seems to me, that
the testimony itself has the potential, if not controlling probability of confusing the
jury."); United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) ( "Indeed, by our
estimation, the added aura of reliability that necessarily surrounds expert testimony
would have placed the officers' credibility here in jeopardy."); United States v.
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dents169 it was determined that mock jurors viewing expert testimony
gave the defendant lower guilt ratings and estimated a lower general
percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony. 170 However, the study
varied the presentation of the eyewitness by levels of confidence. 1
71
Thus, these conclusions say nothing about whether or not the expert
was helpful in tempering jurors' beliefs of a witness when that witness
was incorrect. Despite increased scrutiny in deliberations 72 and
reduced guilt ratings it would be incorrect to assume that this scrutiny
leads to more just results or that expert testimony is the only way to
achieve more accurate convictions. Juror skepticism elicited through
expert testimony results in injustice in instances where the original
eyewitness was correct and the skepticism was unwarranted.
The extent to which expert testimony in this regard is 'juror edu-
cation" is also highly debatable. Evidence introduced by experts in
this context is designed not to educate the jury on a topic about which
they know nothing, but to both correct their knowledge and increase
their skepticism. The cases discussed above favoring expert admission
do not contend that juries are unable to evaluate the credibility of a
witness on the stand-to deny so would be to deny the essence of the
entire system-but rather that an expert is needed to guide their
knowledge. In many cases, this is a correct assumption. In Daubert, a
juror would not be expected to know the way a particular medication
interacts with a fetus. The jury in Kumho was not expected to know
how a tire is constructed and the ways it could be faulty. The "systolic
Purham, 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (explaining that an expert witness would
not have assisted the jury in evaluating the witness's perception and identification and
could result in unfair prejudice because of aura around experts). Contra Mathis, 264
F.3d at 339 ("There is no suggestion, however, that such an aura of reliability was
unwarranted in this case or, to be more precise, that it was unfairly prejudicial. From
the record, it seems that Dr. Loftus was an extremely qualified, experienced academic
presenting opinions on topics near the heart of his expertise.").
169 The population of university students in this study, and indeed most studies
discussed in this Note, is markedly different than the population at large. Students
tend to be more educated and younger than the rest of the population at large. How-
ever, a comparative study reveals that differences between the general population and
students acting asjurors were negligible. See Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity
ofJury Simulations: Is the Juiy Still out?, 23 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 75, 78-80 (1999) (not-
ing that most studies find little difference between student and nonstudentjuries); see
also Harmon M. Hosch et al., Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy
onJuiy Decisions, 4 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 287, 294 (1980) ("[O]ne cannot conclude that
college students differ significantly from more typical jurors.").
170 Fox & Walters, supra note 107, at 224-27.
171 Id. at 218-29.
172 See Harmon M. Hosch, A Comparison of Three Studies of the Influence of Expert
Testimony on Jurors, 4 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 297, 297 (1980).
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blood pressure deception test" in Frye, though crude and unreliable,
was designed to test the objective fact of whether or not a person was
lying, a deliberate act subject to artful concealment.173 The common
theme in these cases is that the subject of expert testimony was some-
thing that was entirely outside of the scope of knowledge of the com-
mon person. The case presented for eyewitness-identification expert
testimony is entirely different. Both courts and commentators frame
the discussion regarding memory storage and recall as one of which
jurors are aware, but are simply incorrect. Thus, rather than attempt-
ing to inform, experts here aim to correct. However, with eyewit-
nesses, the expert testimony is not about the individual on the stand
or the particular likelihood that the individual identified the right
person; 174 it is about general conclusions drawn from a random sam-
pling of humans. The rationale behind allowing this type of "educa-
tion" can potentially justify any expert to testify regarding an area that
the common person may misconceive, risking inefficiency without
necessarily realizing tangible gains injustice.
175
E. Federal Rules of Evidence as Grounds for Exclusion
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403 provide two rule-based
grounds on which a district court can base its exclusion of expert testi-
mony. To exclude under Rule 702, the district court must either find
that the science is unreliable and invalid or that the proffered testi-
mony does not fit the facts of the case. 176 If neither of these are met,
the judge may still rule that the probative value of the evidence is
outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
177
The overwhelming opinion in the scientific community is that
eyewitness identifications are generally unreliable.1 78 Over twenty
years ago a judge on the Ninth Circuit concluded that "[c]ourts and
scholars have long recognized the untrustworthiness of eyewitness tes-
173 For further discussion of these cases, see supra notes 29-37, 59-69 and accom-
panying text.
174 If it were, the ecological fallacy would apply.
175 See generally Elaine D. Ingulli, Trial by Jury: Reflections on Witness Credibility, Expert
Testimony, and Recantation, 20 VAL. U. L. Rv. 145, 152-54 (1986) (detailing judicial
reluctance to introduce experts commenting on witness credibility and expressing a
desire to protect the jury's role).
176 FED. R. EVID. 702.
177 Id. R. 403.
178 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. For a thorough review of the litera-
ture, see ELIZABETH F. LoFrus ET AL., EYEWrrNESS TSTIMONY 11-112 (4th ed. 2007).
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timony.' 79 Exclusion of testimony on the grounds that it is unreliable
does not seem to be a viable strategy. District courts, post-Daubert,
conduct extensive pretrial hearings in which all facets of the proposed
expert's testimony are reviewed and approved by the court if they
meet a threshold level of scientific validity. However, as discussed
above, the specific phenomena that are admitted are varied and
inconsistent. In fact, the only cases in recent history where proffered
testimony was excluded on the grounds that it was unreliable were
simply cases where the experts failed "to provide sufficient articles or
data."18 0 The studies and support are in ample supply-it is merely a
matter of the expert and counsel presenting it properly. 8 1 Despite
the lack of consistency across courts, the argument that expert testi-
mony is based on unreliable science is weak.
The "fit" requirement of Rule 702 provides a stronger ground for
exclusion. In finding a clear fit between Dr. Fulero's theories and the
facts of the case, the judge in Smith concluded that the second prong
of the Daubert test was met.1 8 2 The court, rather crudely, treated this
requirement as a simple checklist. If the witness was of a different
race than the offender, then there was fit with the cross-racial phe-
nomenon. Similarly, if the witness was stressed, there was fit with the
stress phenomenon. 183 This, however, is not the correct way to inter-
pret the requirement. Rule 702, which Daubert interpreted,
1 8 4
requires the testimony to "assist the trier of fact." 185 The extent to
which this evidence may "assist" the trier of fact is questionable. In
fact, given problems with the ecological fallacy, expert testimony actu-
ally impairs the trier of fact by essentially requiring them to force con-
clusions made about a large population onto individuals.'
86
179 United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting).
180 See United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 923-25 (9th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d
1207, 1212 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (citing United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883 (8th Cir.
1996)).
181 Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1212 ("[O]ther courts have specifically reviewed Dr.
Fulero's methods and found that they 'easily' satisfy the first Daubert inquiry." (quot-
ing United States v. Moonda, No. 1:06CR0395, 2007 WL 1875861, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
June 28, 2007))).
182 See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
183 This is the same rationale discussed by the Third Circuit in finding an abuse of
discretion in the exclusion of testimony. See United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380,
1398-1401 (3d Cir. 1991).
184 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
185 FED. R. EviD. 702.
186 See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, this ground for exclusion can most easily be used to
weed out all testimony that is about areas clearly in the common
understanding of the jury-phenomena described by the Third Cir-
cuit as in need of no illumination. 187 These topics include the ways in
which memory is formulated, the suggestiveness of pretrial proce-
dures, the impact of drugs and alcohol on perception, and the effect
of viewing time.
Finally, expert testimony on those areas that are both reliable and
fit the facts can still be excluded if it risks interfering with the effi-
ciency of the trial or the role of the jury. One way this can happen is
through a battle of the experts, resulting in undue costs, delay, and
juror confusion.' 88 Another ground is that the bias the testimony-
and opposing expert testimony, if any-can instill into the jury by
unjustifiably making them untrustworthy of all eyewitness testi-
mony.1 89 Rule 403 is where Smith identified the split among the cir-
cuits,' 90 and is where the most conflict lies surrounding admission.
The risk of invading the province of the jury by presenting testimony
that leads to discrediting a witness-even if it is a matter of degree-is
another strong reason for exclusion.
F Alternative Methods of Juror Education
In spite of this position, there are cognizable risks that accom-
pany eyewitness testimony. As in Coleman v. Alabama,191 discussed in
the Introduction, when an eyewitness takes the stand, only he or she
and the perpetrator-whether the defendant or someone else
entirely-know what happened. The risk of wrongful conviction
based on sincere yet inaccurate testimony is one that requires vigi-
lance.' 92 Due to the questionable nature of expert testimony in our
system of justice, other methods must be utilized and refined to pro-
tect against miscarriages ofjustice. This subpart briefly outlines three
such methods: voir dire, cross-examination, and jury instructions.
None of these are necessarily sufficient in and of themselves, but
working together they provide procedural safeguards. The purpose of
this subpart is not to review the efficacy of each procedural safeguard.
There is an ample supply of jury studies and psychology experiments
187 See United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United
States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 212 (3d Cir. 1999)).
188 See supra Part IV.C.
189 See supra Part IV.D.
190 United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1219 (M.D. Ala. 2009).
191 399 U.S. 1 (1970); see text accompanying notes 1-4.
192 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 ("[I]t is better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.").
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studying the way people process information and the way juries
receive testimony and there will be more. Those studies, however, go
more to the strategic choices of trial lawyers and not the formalities of
what may or may not be presented in a trial.' 93 Instead, I intend to
briefly present each of these methods as potential alternatives in need
of further study.
Voir dire provides an opportunity to truly gauge the biases of the
jury pool. Rather than relying on abstract studies of college students,
voir dire allows attorneys to ask specific, targeted questions tailored to
the facts of the case. 194 Further, this process provides the opportunity
for the jury to be primed for the issues that might arise in the case.
Counsel, who would otherwise rely on an expert, can vet potential
jurors to determine their individual perceptions and biases in order to
protect against incorrect assumptions in deliberations. This was even
utilized in Smith. During jury selection, counsel for the defense que-
ried: "Does anyone believe that eyewitness perception and identifica-
tion are always accurate?"1 9 5 At the very least, this and additional
follow-up questions can sensitize the jury to the forthcoming issues
from the start.
Once a witness takes the stand, opposing counsel has a full
opportunity for cross-examination. In upholding the exclusion of
expert testimony, the Seventh Circuit relied on cross-examination as
an effective safeguard:
Additionally, all of the witnesses who identified defendants were
thoroughly cross examined about the reliability of their identifica-
tion, the length of time they saw the defendant, the 'conditions
under which they saw the defendant, the length of time which
elapsed between the witness seeing the defendant and the photos or
the defendant in person, the number of times the witness saw the
photo arrays, and when the witness was shown the photo army.
Thus, the jury was made aware of many of the factors which may
effect [sic] perception, retention and recall.... Thus, although the
jury may not understand the intricacies of perception, recall and
193 SeeJennifer L. Overbeck, Note, Beyond Admissibility: A Practical Look at the Use of
Eyewitness Expert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1896 (2005)
(suggesting "concrete ways of harnessing psychological research to formulate effective
trial strategies").
194 See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992) ("In the
present controversy the jury was questioned during voir dire about recall and the abil-
ity to identify persons they had seen only briefly, or had not seen for a period of
time.").




retention, the jury is generally aware of the problems with
identification.
196
However, cross-examination, while reliable in uncovering incon-
sistencies in testimony, does nothing to combat a confident, but incor-
rect, witness. In dissent, Judge Ferguson on the Ninth Circuit
disagreed: "The key to the Amaral holding is that panel's conclusion
[that] this information may be obtained by cross-examination. How-
ever, cross-examination cannot uncover the reasons for misidentifica-
tion because the witness honestly does not believe he or she has
misidentified the defendant.1 97 Even if there is a risk that the jury
does not use the information correctly, courts have still relied on
cross-examination.1 98 In one study, when mock juries were shown a
cross-examination in which the eyewitness presented conflicting testi-
mony, they were "significantly less likely to convict and perceived the
defendant as less culpable and the eyewitness as less effective." 199
While this is only one study, it indicates that cross-examination is
another route to achieve similar goals of expert testimony.
2 0 0
Finally, jury instructions can be used as a means to convey the
proper weight that should be placed on eyewitness testimony.
20 1
These instructions are theoretically stronger than expert testimony
because they reflect the opinion of the court as a matter of law.
Rather than running the risk of being viewed as an advocate for one
side,20 2 jury instructions presented by the judge instead can communi-
196 Curry, 977 F.2d at 1051 (alterations in original) (quoting the district court); see
also United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) ("This line of testimony
intrudes into the jury's domain. Bell's defense counsel was capable of exposing to the
jury any potentially unreliable bases underlying Jojola's identification through cross
examination, assuming they were not already apparent.").
197 United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting).
198 See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Whether
the jury accepts it or not, how the jury accepts it is clearly within their province.").
199 Garrett L. Berman & Brian L. Cutler, Effects of Inconsistencies in Eyewitness Testi-
mony on Mock-Juror Decision Making, 81 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 170, 174 (1996).
200 See generally Stacey L. Wagner, The Right to a jury of One's Peers: An Analytical
Review ofJuror Biases and Their Implications for the Legal System 25-27 (May 2009)
(unpublished B.S. thesis, Depauw University) (on file with author) (detailing studies
concluding juries give less weight to witnesses discredited through cross-
examination).
201 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in fact, requires jury instructions on the
potential unreliability of cross-racial identifications for that reason. See State v.
Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 458-59 (NJ. 1999).
202 See Wagner, supra note 200, at 37 (referring to expert witnesses as "hired
guns").
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cate the risks of placing too much emphasis on eyewitnesses neutrally.
An illustrative set of instructions was utilized in United States v. Hall
20 3:
[T]he district court properly gave the jury an instruction on the
reliability of eyewitness identification to aid the jury in evaluating
the eyewitness identification testimony introduced at trial. Specifi-
cally, the district court cautioned the jury to consider: (1) the
opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time in
question and later to make a reliable identification; (2) the influ-
ences and circumstances under which the witness has made the
identification; (3) the credibility of each identification witness; (4)
whether the witness is truthful; and (5) whether the witness had the
capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the mat-
ter covered in the witness's testimony. These instructions ade-
quately focused "the jury's attention on the reliability of the witness
identifications and... acquainted [ed] the jury with factors relevant
in evaluating those identifications."
20 4
In combination, these three procedural mechanisms address the
identical concerns expressed in favor of expert testimony. The pri-
mary justification made in defense of the use of experts is that the jury
is generally either unaware of how the mind works or is incorrect in
understanding the factors that affect memory recall. An expert, the
argument goes, can testify to correct those misconceptions and fill in
the gaps. Voir dire, cross-examination, and jury instructions, at least
in theory, accomplish the same goals. At the beginning, middle, and
end, the trial defense counsel and the judge have the opportunity to
prime the jury to the frailties of the mind. Even if an expert may be
"more" effective-a battle better suited for the laboratory-the risks
associated with the expert are too high.
CONCLUSION: THE EYES HAvE IT
Science is replication. It attempts to ascertain truth through the
replication of controlled experiments that, when conducted carefully
and consistently, can illuminate truth. Jurors are asked to evaluate
history. They are asked to sit quietly through a trial and listen to every
piece of evidence about something that happened in the past. They
listen to each side's version of the incident and render a verdict based
on credibility assessments, without explaining how they arrived at
their decision, before returning to their lives. The facts of the case
cannot be replicated, only retold by those involved. In calling for
203 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999).
204 Id. at 1107 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Anderson, 739 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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expert testimony, attorneys and psychologists attempt to use science
to explain history. This is inappropriate. It is the juror's role in deter-
mining history to use their experience to determine if that identifica-
tion is credible. Utilizing an expert, in effect, to substitute their
credibility judgment for that of the jury increases the likelihood that
the ecological fallacy will influence the jury's verdict. The testimony
does not provide the jury additional facts to aid them in determining
history. It instead confuses, misleads, and oversteps its bounds.
Given the way our system of justice functions, the proper mecha-
nisms for ensuring innocent people are not wrongfully convicted are
procedural. Controlling the makeup of the jury through voir dire,
discrediting eyewitnesses in cross-examination, and limiting the jury
through cautionary instructions are the proper ways to control the ver-
sion of history the jury is to understand. By focusing on these mecha-
nisms, courts can strike a proper balance between judicial efficiency,
protecting the innocent, and convicting the guilty.
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